This paper reconsiders the link between tight money policies and inflation in the spirit of Sargent and Wallace's (1981) influential paper "Some Unpleasaiit Monetarist Arithmetic". A standard neoclassical model with production, capital, bonds, and returii dominated currency is used to study the long-run effects on inflation ofa tightening ofmonetary policy engineered via a open market sale of bonds. The potential for tight money policies to.be inflationary (unpleasant arithmetic) exists even when the real interest rate is below the growth rate of the economy, and such equilibria can bestable. Incontrast, when moneta^policy isconducted viaa fixed inflation-rate rule, the only stable equilibrium is theone that exhibits pleasant arithmetic. The two monetary policy rules'therefore produce sharply different predictions about the likely observability of unpleasant arithmetic in real world economies. This paper reconsiders the link between tight money policies and inflation in the spirit of Sargent and Wallace's (1981) influential paper "Some Unpleasaiit Monetarist Arithmetic". A standard neoclassical model with production, capital, bonds, and returii dominated currency is used to study the long-run effects on inflation ofa tightening ofmonetary policy engineered via a open market sale of bonds. The potential for tight money policies to .be inflationary (unpleasant arithmetic) exists even when the real interest rate is below the growth rate of the economy, and such equilibria can bestable. Incontrast, when moneta^policy is conducted viaa fixed inflation-rate rule, the only stable equilibrium is the one that exhibits pleasant arithmetic.
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Introduction
Standard conventional wisdom suggests that a tightening ofmonetary policy ought to be accom panied by a reduction in inflation. There is even ample evidence, at least from highly inflationary economies like Germany and Argentina in the post-war period, to support such a notion. A coun terexample to this well-accepted lineof thinking is provided by Sargent and Wallace in their classic paper "Some Unpleasant Monetarist Arithmetic". In that paper, they show that in a standard model where monetary pohcy cannot affect the fixed real interest rate, it is quite possible for a tightening of monetary policy to precipitate an increase in inflation ("unpleasant monetarist arith metic"). This "spectacular" result is however predicated on the satisfaction of one crucial yet controversial condition: the after-tax real rate of interest has to be higher than the real rate of growth of the economy.
Subsequent to the publication of the Sargent and Wallace paper, a lively debate has ensued in which a number of researchers have questioned the relevance of this condition for real world economies, and have gone on to Wonder ifunpleasant arithmetic is nothing but a theoretical curiosum. Darby (1984) and more recently, Espinosa and Russell (1998) , have pointed out for example that for post-war U.S, the after-tax real rate of return on government debt is close to zero and that the real growth rate of GDP is over 3 percent. The implication is clear: since we live in a low real-interest-rate world, the only arithmetic we are likely to observe is of the "pleasant" variety. This paper is part of aline of research dating back to Miller and Sargent (1984) and more recently, Bhattacharya, Guzman, and Smith (1998) and Espinosa and Russell (1999, 2001 ) that questions this implication. At a broader level, it seeks to understand the long-run impact of monetary pol icy on inflation in low real-interest-rate economies using a model with neoclassical production and capital mwhich money has real effects.^Although these other papers have revealed the possibility of obtaining unpleasant arithmetic in low interest economies when the marginal product of capital is variable, ours is the flrst to focus on this case. In a sense, our paper is a direct descendant of Bhattacharya, Guzman, and Smith (1998) who delivered unpleasant arithmetic in a low real-rate economy but with a fixed marginal product of capital.
To that end, we produce a model that is ahybrid of Diamond (1965) and Wallace (1984) . The former component essentially allows us to replace the assumption of alinear production technology in Sargent and Wallace (1981) with the assumption of a neoclassical production technology. As a 'Throughout the paper, we use the term "real interest rate" to signify the real return on one-period government bonds, and not the real marginal product of capital. 2 result, the,real interest rate is no longer fixed. The latter comporieiit permits us to study equilibria where money is held even .when dominated by competing stores of \^ue. In our setup then, the single final gopd may be used to purchase government bonds directly,or it may .be stored to yield capital the following period. The, latter activity ris assumed to intermediated, and also subject'to a standard currency reserve requirement. Capital dominates money in. rate of return. We focus on equilibria where the reserve requirement binds. In such equilibria, bonds dominate monej^in rate of return, and the marginal product-of capital, exceeds the re^return on bonds. It remains possible for the real rate, of return on-government bonds to stay below the long run real rate of growth (unity in our case) of the economy.^.
Following Wallace (1984) , we.^sume that the monetary authority chooses the bonds-money ratio in the initial period and teps the ratio fixed.for all time. Chginges in this.bond-money ratio may then be thought of as permanent open m^ket.operations. As in Wallace (1984) , a tightening of monetary policy therefore implies a permanent cut in this ratio. In such a world, and for fairly general specifications of preferences and technology, we provide a complete characterization of the necessary and sufficient conditions needed to, obtain unpleasant monetarist arithmetic in steady states. In particular, we show if household saving is mildly sensitive to its return, then multiple equilibria (with the same bondsTmoney ratio) are possible. At some of.these many equilibria, the volume of seigniorage revenue the government collects .is increasing in the inflation rate. These are the ones that are the most empirically relevant. At those •equilibria, tight money necessarily reduces the capital stock, and niay even be inflationary. In particular, if the initial real interest rate exceeds the growth rate of the,economy, then the unpleasant arithmetic of Sargent Wallace (1984) . Specifically, they assume that monetary policy is conducted by fixing the money growth rate and allowing the bonds-money ratio to adjust accordingly. Second, our specification of preferences and technology ismore general; they focus on return-invariant saving and Cobb-Douglas technology throughout. Third, they use reserve requirements assumptions under which the return rates on capital and bonds are equal and then introduce "capital intermediation costs" to create a wedge between them. In contrast, we make assumption on reserve requirements that produce this wedge without the need for such costs. The last two differences are possibly trivial enough, but not the first.
Received wisdom from related overlapping generation models suggests that, under a fixed money growth rule (as in Sargent, 1987) , only the equilibria exhibiting pleasant arithmetic are dynamically stable. Espinosa and Russell (2001) have confirmed this wisdom and gone on to raise concerns about the actual observabiHty of stationary equilibria exhibiting unpleasant arithmetic. That is, they have tried to rule out the possibility of observing unpleasant arithmetic on stability grounds.® Our results indicate that under their assumptions on preferences, but with a fixed bonds-money ratio rule, there is a unique low real-rate empirically relevant steady state that is dynamically stable, and which exhibits unpleasant arithmetic. Under more general preference (and production) assumptions, and under the fixed bonds-money ratio rule, all empirically relevant steady states are dynamically approachable, including those exhibiting unpleasant arithmetic.''' The upshot is that
In amodel without production and capital, Espinosa and Russell (1998) show that under low interest rates, a small tightening of money is disinflationary ifinitially money is not too tight.
In fact, pleasant arithmetic is not apossibility in Bhattacharya, Guzman and Smith (1998) under their assumption that the real return to storage exceeds unity.
•"We thank two anonymous referees for drawing our attention to this paper.
Espinosa and Russell (2001) do not present a formal stability analysis in the more general return-dependent saving case. Numerical experiments however indicate that their stability results are robust to this generalization.
With return dependent (invariant) saving, the equilibrium law of motion for the capital stock is two (one) dimensional. The "strong" dynamic stability of the unique steady state in the latter case is replaced by the "weaker" Each agent is endowed with one unit of labor when young, and is retired when old. In addition, the initial old agents are each endowed with > 0 units of fiat currency and ki > 0 units of capital. , '
Let Cit (c2t) denote the consumption of the final good by a representative young (old) agent born at t All such agents have preferences representable by the utility function U{cit,c2t) where Uis twice-continuously differentiable, strictly increasing, and strictly concave in its arguments.
Finally, the government has a constant net-of-interest deficit of p > 0 in each period. The government does not levy any direct taxes and hence finances this every period entirely by issuing bonds and money. Let Mt denote the per capita stock of money outstanding at the end of period t, and Bt denote the outstanding per capita supply of bonds (in nominal terms) where Mo = Bo = 0.
Markets
Young agents supply their labor endowment inelastically in competitive labor markets, earning a wage income oiwt at time t where
In addition, capital is traded in competitive capital markets, and earns agross real return of qt+i We now turn to the determination of the interest on deposits (and bonds). As stated earlier,
private agents cannot access the capital production technology directly. Banks arise to perform a simple intermediation function. They collect the individual deposits' from' all young agents and invest it in the capital production.technology on their behalf. In return,-private'agents are promised a competitive return of per unit deposited. We assume that banks are subject ,to a currency reserve requirement in that for every unit of funds invested in the capital production technology, they are required by law to hold a fixed fraction Aof that amount in the form of currency reserves.
That is, .
where-A G(0,1)..Let A:(+idenote capital, and mt denote real reserves. Then, the banks' balance
following budget constraint; cso < giki + Mo/pi. Thus, at date 1, the initial old agents receive capital income, Qtki, and nominal money, Mo, and they consume it all. assumption solely to obtain sharper results. There is enough evidence to suggest Kudoh empirically quite plausible. The consequences of abandoning this assumption are spelt out in holds, then capital dominates money in rate ofreturn, and the reserve requirement (6) binds. In passing, note that (A.2) also impHes that f'(kt+i) > Pt+i' Henceforth, we exclusively focus on equilibria that satisfy (A.2).^L et Then <! > represents the fraction of deposits held in the form ofcapital, while (!-(/}) can be interpreted as the fraction of deposits required to be held as reserves. Then (1 -(p) may be interpreted as a conventional reserve requirement. The real interest rate on bank deposits is then
given by a weighted sum of returns to capital and money, i.e.,
Pt
Pt+i -^Qt+i + (1 -
\Pt+i/ must hold. It follows that if (A.2) holds, then > ptipt+i holds too {i.e., in the equilibria we consider, bonds always dominate money in rate of return). It is the presence of a binding reserve requirement that creates a wedge between the return to capital and that on bonds.^^Since money pays no interest while bonds do, an open market purchase [i.e., selling more bonds) as an mstrument of deficit finance essentially replaces a cheaper device with a more expensive one. We explore the consequences of this observation below.
The Government
The government finances a constant net-of-interest deficit of p > 0 every period by issuing oneperiod default-free bonds and by printing money The government's flow budget constraint is
where h is the gross nominal interest rate on bonds. Equation (8) states that the government finances its expenditures and interest obligations on outstanding government debt, from seignorage revenue earned by money creation and from the sale of new bonds. Using rrit~Mt/Npu h = It is important to note that fiat money is valued in this setup solely because of the presence of a reserve re quirement. In other words, if money is dominated in return and no legal restrictions (e.g., reserve requirements) are present, the demand for money would be zero. Since the current purpose is to study alternative modes of deficit finance, we restrict our attention only on equilibria where a positive demand for money (reserves) exists.
In Espinosa and Russell (1999, 2001 ), capital intermediation costs creates a similar wedge between the return to capital and the return to bonds. This particular difference between our models does not seem to create any major qualitative difi'erences in the results.
and pt = r w e can rewrite (8) . . .
Following Sargent and Wallace (1981), we assume that the fiscal pthority in time 1chooses the primary deficit g for all t and thatit is the monetary authority that is forced to design its policies so that (9) is satisfied each period.^"* Following Wallace (1984) ,^® Bhattacharya, Guzman, and Smith (1998), among others, we assume that the treasury fixes at date 1the ratio of government debt to money, /z, where
Vi>l.
The central bank conducts its monetarypolicy by chan^ng the nominal money stock at all future dates to ensure the ratio is always kept fixed at Henceforth, we will refer to this type of monetary poUcy as a fixed bond-money ratio rule. It may be convenient to think, ofvariations in
Mas permanent open market operations. We will sometimes interpret ah increase in as a tight money poHcy. Finally, at date 1, the central bank also sets the reserve requirement (1 -4))P 3 Equilibrium
Characterization^>
We begm by formally defining amonetary competitive equilibrium for our economy.
Definition 1 Abinding mohetat^equilibrium is aset ofsequences for allocations {St}, {frj, {fcj, {mt}, prices {gj, {wj, {pt}, {pj, and the initial conditions Mq >0, >6, Bo =0such that (a) factor markets clear, i.e., (l)- (2) hold, (b) asset market clears: f kt+,^bt^S c) pt e9?++ for all t, (d) the government' s budget constraints at date 1, p^g +Mq =Mj +Bj, and at dates t > 1, i.e., (9) hold, and (e) .f >pi/ptU > 0.
'^Since Bo = 0, the government budget constraint at date 1is "^Ml Moŵ hich may be rewritten as p.j +Mo =M+B.. I" equilibrium,,his pins down the initial price level "-e central bank, see Barnett (2001) nominal fLe b'^ndrtVtrnLlrlrne'Torm^r^'^o trbrdtectchll^^^' -o central bank conducts
Noting that bt-\-dt~4 >^t +ij we can rewrite the asset market clearing condition as = <^>3 {uJ (kt), pt+i).
The equilibrimn gross return on real balances (the inverse of the gross rate of inflation) for given <p and g can now be determined as *
Substituting (12) in (7), it is possible to write (7) as <i^ktf'{kt) + (1 -0)(1 + }i)kt+i -(ffg (12) [i+Mi-'jspi • (13) describes the equilibrium rate of return on government bonds as a function of the capitallabor ratio:-Therefore, (11) and (13), along with the restrictions embedded in Definition 1 jointly constitute the equilibrium conditions for this economy. Together they determine the time path of the capital-labor ratio, , given ki and the government's prior pre-committed choices of 0, Ml, and g.
Note that morder to describe the entire price sequence it is necessary to pin down the price level at date 1, which is an endogenous variable. The initial price level is given by Ml mi + bi-g' where mi+6i = (1 +m) k2. Here, gis determined by the fiscal authority and Mi, the initial quantity of money, is determined by the monetary authority.
Steady State Equilibria
We first explore the issue of existence of stationary equihbria. In a steady state, kt Define^= 1+ (1 -(/>). Then we may rewrite (11) and (13) (17) and that p' (A;) < 0 holds for sufficiently small values of g. Define Rm to be the stationary gross real return on money and tt~1/^to be the gross inflation rate. Then, it follows from (12) that = T -Jk
Combining (16) and (15) yields
A '
The solutioh'tp (19) describes the steady state capital-labor ratio,' fc*, where'/:*'= (fc*). It is easy to verify that in-a binding monetary'equilibrium,/c* must additionally satisfy ' '
For future reference, denote the slope of the function Q(k) by 0 (fc). As we shall see below, the size of ©(k) is singularly important in-determining the properties of various equilibria.
It is easy to check that^®^' Figure 1 illustrates several configurations ofthe function Q{k). For g =' 0, Q(k) is concave and strictly increasing in k. In this case, as is well-known, there is a unique steady state if k/u){k) is increasing in k.^^Similarly, if saving is return-invariant, i.e., Sp = 0, then there is necessarily an unique equilibrium,(just as in Espinosa and'Russell (1999)).' Consider-'the more gerieral'case where Sp > ,0 and p > 0. As g increases, Q,(k). shifts down in a' manner illustrated in Figure 1 ; multiple steady state equilibria are easily possible here.-In contrast-with the standard Diamond'model with fiat money however, not all candidate stationary equilibria-in our -model may satisfy (20).' Lemma 1 Ifsaving is interest-invariant, then the steady state equilibHum k* is necessarily unique, and is characterized by 0 (A:*) < 1.^saving is increasing in its return and p > 0, then an unique equilibrium (characterized by 0 (fc*)^1) is possible; similarly, multiple equilibria (characterized by 0 {k*)^1) with the same bonds-money ratio is also possible.
(fc) may be also be written as a combination of various elasticities h w^if /(^) = (0,1). Howevl^r; for /(A:) specified a. in (24) below, k/ujik) IS decreasmg (increasing) in fc for small (I^ye) values of See von fhadden (1999) for details.
Examples
We now explore the issue of existence by means of some illustrative numerical examples.
1. Suppose the'production function and utility function is specified as follows: 2. Suppose we retain (23) but respecify the production function as follows:
The parameters of the economy are as follows: ai = 0.11, 02 = 0.25, /i = 0.57, g = 0,<f) = 0.65, 7 = 0.97, /? = 0.89, and 6 = -0.71. Under this choice of parameterization, it can be checked that k* = 0.12 and k* = 0.31 are the two steady states.
Seigniorage
The government's ability to make use ofcurrency and (possibly) bond seigniorage to raise revenue obviously faces certain endogenous restrictions. In particular, there may arise a tension between the inflation tax base and the inflation tax rate when it comes to raising a fixed amount ofseigniorage.
We turn to these issues below. First, we compute the total seigniorage raised in steady states, in the economy. From (9), it follows that the total seigniorage collected at a steady state k' is given by^k ; fi) = Xk 1+ n -ARm{k*) .
Substitute (7) into (15) Then, we substitute k* = h {Rm\ y) into (25) to obtain the expression for total seigniorage:
The right hand side of (??) is the conventional total seigniorage Laifer curve (drawn-wuth the stationary return to money on the horizontal axis).^'^For future reference, a steady state k* is henceforth described'to be on the "gobd side" of the total seigniorage Lsiffer curve if an increase in the inflation rate necessarily raises the volume of seigniorage revenue at that steady state. Proposition 1 On the (H, Rm) space, a steady state k* is on the "good'side" of the total seignior age Laffer curve, i.e., (dH (Rm', /^) /dRm < 0) holds if and only if B(k*) < 1.
Proposition 1 implies that an-increase in the inflation rate necessarily raises the volume of seigniorage revenue only when 0 (ft*) 1 obtains. They are also the onesrthat are regarded widely as being the most empirically'realistic because ofthe underlying relationship between the inflation rate and seigniorage revenue. With return-invariant; saving, there is a unique steady state, and the seigniorage Laifer curve has only one side, the "good side". The intuition for this result is as
follows. Ceteris paribus, an increase in the inflation rate, given a fixed inflation tax base (as is the case under return-invariant saving), increases currency seigniorage. At the s^e time, it reduces the overall return.on bank deposits and hence, .the return-on government bonds. This fall in the interest rate on bonds reduces-the government's interest expense. The overall effect is that the government's combined revenue rises.
Henceforth, we focus our attention only on those equilibria that are on the "good side" of the seigniorage" Laffer curve. That is, we will niaintain that Assumption 1 Q (k*) < -l holds.
Bond Seigniorage
In our analysis, the real interest rate is endogenous and may be greater or less than the growth rate of the economy. Equilibrium bond holdings are also endogenous. As sucK, the, revenue from "This IS by no means the only way to draw aLaffer curve. Espinosa ahd Russell (2001) draw Laffer curves with the real interest rate oil the horizontal axis while others present.them with the inflation rate on the horizontal axis.
Our formulation follows Sargent (1987) .
the sale of bonds may go up or down when the interest rate changes. The revenue from the sale of bonds in steady states is given by .
Sb^b(p) (l~p) = fi\k{l~p(k)).
For future reference, we collect some information about the volume of bond seigniorage in this economy in the lemma below.
Lemma 2 a) At steady state k*, the volume of bond seigniorage decreases with an increase in the interest rate on bonds if and only if l-p(r) k*p' (k*)
For small g, T {k*) < 0 holds. If p <1 holds at a steady state k*, then
Dynamic Properties of Equilibria
As is clear from Lemma 1 above, multiple stationary equilibria are possible in our model. As such, it becomes crucial to know which steady state a particular economy is going to approach, given an arbitrary initial capital-labor ratio, k\. In the appendix, we prove the following proposition describing the local stability properties ofthe stationary equilibria.
Proposition 2 Suppose saving is return-dependent Then it is possible that multiple stationary equilibria (some characterized by 0 (k*) < 1and others characterized by e {k*) > 1) exist Of these, only the equilibria characterized by Q{k*) < 1 are saddles. Those characterized by 0(fc*) > 1 are likely to be sources. If however, with return-dependent saving, there is an unique equilibrium and
Under return-dependent saving, ste^y states that' have © (k*) < 1 are unstable in the sense that they cannot be approached from an; arbitrary set of initial, conditions. However, they are approachable from correctly chosen initial.conditions that place the economy on the stable manifold or the saddle path. In, this sense, steady states under return-dependent:saving characterized by . 0 (k*) < 1 are potentially d3Tiamically, approachable even though they are unstable. We think of "dynamic approachabihty" as a "weaker" notion of stability.. For future reference, note that if saving is interest?invariant, then there is always^unique equilibrium, and it is necessarily stable.
For future reference, let us collect all our results in one place here.' Thus far, we" have shown that if monetary policy is conducted using a fixedvbonds-money rule, and saving is return-invariant, then there is an unique dynamically stable" long-run equilibrium. At that equilibrium, increasing the money growth rate always-raises revenue (across steady states) for the government. 
Lemma 3 Under Assumption (A.l), dk/dii <0 ai asteady state characterized by ©(k*) < 1.
* > This result is crucial to much of what follows. What it says is that ifmonetary policy .is" con ducted using afixed bond^money rule, and saving is relatively insensitive to its return (Assumption A.l), then at any steady state on the good side of the total seigniorage Laffer curve, a marginal foreshadow, mSection 5below, we show that were the central bank to follow afixed inflation rate rule instead, then even with return-invariant saving and reasonable looking parameters, there are two steady states, one stable and the other unstable (though both are potentially dynamically approachable). 15 tightening of monetary policy reduces the long-run capital stock. Two effects are at work here.
When the treasury increases the supply of bonds, agents buy up this debt only at a higher promised return on bonds. With return-invariant saving, a shift towards more bonds in private portfolios causes bank deposits get crowded out. At a given return on money, the bank is forced to lower its capital holdings (because of the reserve requirement) in order to raise the" return on deposits so as to match up with the new higher return on bonds.
To study the effects of a marginal tightening on the steady state rate of inflation, transform (18) into an expression for the steady state inflation rate:
Ata steady state k* characterized by 0 (A:*) < 1, (32) implicitly defines k* = x (fi), where x' (//) < 0.
Substitute k* = x {y) into (33a) to obtain , = 1+^.
(1 + m) -(m)) -Equation (34) gives us an expression for the gross inflation rate as a function of /z, provided that k' is approachable. Then, the eff'ect of an increase in^on the inflation rate is captured by:
Using (32), and Lemma 2, we can simplify (35) to:
For sufficiently small values of g, we know from Lemma 2 that r{k*) < 0 holds. It follows then that the sign of^crucially depends on whether the initial real interest rate, p^l and on the sign of (which in turn, is naturally connected to the stabiUty properties ofk*). interest rates have to.be higher than the growth rate of the economy hold for real-world economies. Darby (1984) , and more recently, Espinosa and Russell (1998), have pointed out that for example that for post-war U.S., the"after-tax real rate^of return on government debt is near zero, while the average real growth rate of GDP has been around 3%. Miller and Sargent (1984) and later Bhattacharya, Guzman, and Smith (1998);went on,to consider the possibility of resurrecting the unpleasant arithmetic by weakening the ,unre^stic:high real rate condition. Part (b) of Proposition 3is in that vein. Itstates that even if the return on bonds is less than the growth rate of the economy, it is still possible that a tight money policy may raise the long-run, inflation rate. It bears emphasis here that if permanent open market operations have,no real effects, i.e., = 0obtains, then the necessary and sufficient condition for unpleasant arithmetic to hold wbuld he p>l. Therefore, in order to produce a condition for the unpleasant arithmetic.thatjs weaker than the Sargent-Wallace' condition, it is necessary that the. government's open,market activity has real'effects! FVom (32), it is clear that the presence of a unremovable reserve requirement, is necessary for this to happen. In effect then, any weakening of the Sargent-Wallace condition that is achieved in the present paper sale of debt, this bond seigniorage is large enough to finance the government's primary deficit without eventually necessitating anincrease in currency seigniorage. Suppose, as in the experiment ofProposition 3 that the government sells new debt. On the one hand, this directly increases the bond seigniorage 6(1 -p); this is the "tax base effect"ofEspinosa and Russell (1998). On the other hand, for reasons discussed earUer, this reduces the capital stock, and in turn increases the interest rate, which reduces the volume of bond seigniorage (the "tax rate effect" of Espinosa and Russell, 1998). On net, the latter effect outweighs the former. Additionally, the crowding out of capital reduces reserves, and hence reduces the inflation tax base. As such, on the good side of the total seigniorage Laffer curve, the central bank still has to make up the shortfall by raising the inflation rate.^"^Ĉ orollary 2attempts tosomewhat sharpen the requirements for obtaining unpleasant arithmetic in the case when p < 1obtains. Notice that for small g, we know from Lemma 2 that F(A;*) < 0 holds. We also know from Lemma 2that T(k*) < 0impHes that the volume of bond seigniorage decreases with an increase in the bond interest rate at such asteady state. Additionally, since we are focusing our attention only on dynamically approachable steady states, it follows from Proposition 3 that < 0 holds. Then, it is clear that the necessary and sufficient condition for unpleasant arithmetic is the one spelt out in Corollary 2.
It is useful to collect all the qualifiers needed to obtain unpleasant arithmetic in an economy where the real interest rate is below its growth rate. First, it is necessary that monetary policy has real effects; additionally, a marginal tightening of the monetary poficy must reduce the capital stock. Without this, unpleasant arithmetic is obtained only if the real rate of return on bonds exceeds the growth rate of an economy. The next qualifier is that a higher interest rate on bonds reduces bond seigniorage. There are two additional effects to consider. One is that a tight money pohcy (higher refiance on bonds) increases bond seigniorage. The other is that, the tight money policy reduces the capital stock, raises the return on bonds, and thereby reduces bond seigniorage.
The final qualifier needed is that the latter effect exceeds the former, which is the condition in Corollary 2. In plain English, this last condition requires the economy to be on the "bad" side of a bond-seigniorage Laffer curve (see (29)) drawn on the isb,ii) space.^^Parenthetically, it can be Bhattacharya, Guzman, and Smith (1998) use amodel similar to the one presented here to show that unpleasant arithmetic may hold in an economy with p < 1. The difference is that they use an endowment economy, while we work with a Diamond (1965) economy. The driving force of their result is the "tax base effect". Our structure allows a flexible return on capital and hence produces, in addition, a "tax rate effect" which reduces bond seigniorage (as well as currency seigniorage).
"At such an equilibrium, a tightening of monetary policy (sale of bonds) causes the steady state revenue from bonds to fall. This case has been extensively studied in E^inosa and Russell (2001).
.noted that a necessary condition required to" obt^'pleasant''arithmetic when p < 1 is'that the economy-to-be on.the "good" side of a bond-sd^orage Laffer cuiVe drawn on'the (sfr, //) space. This is exactly the type, of condition that Miller arid 'Sargent (1984) How does our'result compare to the one present^in Bhattacharya, Guzman, and Smith (1998).
The crucial difference between our two models is that by virtue of their assumption of a linearstorage saving technolo^, the real interest rate is fixed. The driving force of their result is then the tax base effect"of Espinosa and Russell (1998). A higher bond-money ratio through open market operations crowds out deposits from the portfolio of private agents. This reduction in deposits causes a reduction in the volume of reserves held by banks. Consequently, the inflation tax base falls forcing the central bank to reuse the inflation rate. .In,contrast, in our Diamond (1965) economy, an additional "interest rate effect" emerges, and this effect which is necessarily absent,in .the Bhattacharya, Guzman, and Smith (1998) framework, may reduce the volume of bond seigniorage (as well as currency seigniorage).
Datmgback to Wallace (1984) ; rese^chers have studied'the connection between the pleasantness of the arithmetic andHhe initial marginal product of capital at the_equilibrium being studied. In this context, notice that in our model, as is clear'from (16), when,^> 0holds,./'(^) > 1does not necessarily imply that p > 1holds. Thus Part (b) of Proposition 3 proves that,it is.possible' for tight money to have inflationary conWquences even when the return on bonds is lower and the margmal product of capital is higher than the growth rate of the economy.^' This has two important "For example, consider the specification of preference^gnd technology as described in Section 4.1 below. Let the implications. One is that in contrast to Bhattacharya, Guzman, and Smith (1998), f{k) > 1 is not required for tight money to be inflationaiy. In words, the marginal product of capital being greater than the growth rate is not necessary to obtaining unpleasant monetarist arithmetic. The other implication is that / (^) < 1is not required for tight money to be disinflationary.^^That is, for tight money to reduce the long-run inflation rate, it is not necessary that .the marginal product of capital be less than the growth rate of the economy.
How does our result compare with those in Espinosa and Russell (1999, 2001 )? Recall that Espinosa and Russell consider an alternative policy rule. In their setup, the central bank changes the money growth rate so as to satisfy the Treasury's target level of the bond-money ratio. In the section ahead, we consider a model that is identical to the one described above except that the monetary policy rule is almost identical to the one discussed in Espinosa and Russell. To foreshadow, what Espinosa and Russell (and we will) find is that with return-invariant saving, in cases where there are multiple (two) equihbria, and both the equilibria are characterized by real interest rates that are less than unity, it is the low (high) real-rate equilibrium that is dynamically stable (unstable) and exhibits pleasant (unpleasant) arithmetic, even though both are dynamically approachable. Since real interest rates in most real world economies are quite low, their result has the implication that the only equilibrium one can hope to observe in the real world will exhibit pleasant arithmetic. In other words, they rule out the possibility of unpleasant arithmetic on stability grounds. In sharp contrast, Proposition 3 along with Proposition 2suggests that with return-invariant saving, an equiHbrium with a low real interest rate, and which exhibits unpleasant arithmetic is stable, and hence potentially observable in the real world.
An example with return-invariant saving
In this subsection, we illustrate some of our main results thus far by focussing on an example with return-invariant saving. This will also facihtate the comparison with results obtained by Espinosa and Russell (1999) and others in the hterature. We use the following specification: C/(ci,C2) = Inci -H/3Inc2, which (using (5)} implies that S = pu; (k) /I + /3 = su; (k). Furthermore, assume depreciation, these'transition paths are rather rapll Since p>1, bond seigniorage is negative for aU t. Note that the inflation rate jumps up at the time the new poHcy is implemented, and then 28 Similarly, for n = 7.12, there is a unique steady state, ib* =-1.78.
it declines over time until it reaches the new steady state; At the new steady state, k* = 0.27 P" -1-04, and tt* = 3.87. The initial price level can be computed os pi -3,08. The next example is intended to explore the possibility ofobtaining pleasant arithmetic in low real-interest rate economies. The parameters chosen are; 4> = 0.9, a = 0.2, a = 5, /? = 1,^= 0.2.
The initial value of /£ is 2 and Mi = 1. Figures 3b shows the case where /i increases from 2 to 3 while Figure 3c presents the case where // increases from 5 to As suggested by Lemma 4. pleasant arithmetic obtains for these low (2 to 3) values of //. Note that the gross inflation rate decreases monotonically along the transition path, and bond seigniorage is positive at all dates.
According to Figure 3c , however, as p increases from 5 to 6, the inflation rate starts to rise. This is an illustration of unpleasant arithmetic in low real interest rate economies. The behavior of the inflation rate is similar to the one for high interest rates; inflation jumps up and then declines over time.
Fixed inflation rate rules
Thus far, we have considered a setup where the government conducts monetary poHcy by fixing the bonds-money ratio at the start of time and then choosing a nominal money stock then and all future dates that is consistent with its choice of the bonds-money ratio. In short, the principal instrument of monetary poUcy was the bonds-money ratio. Under this fixed bonds-money ratio rule, we derived the following result. If saving is return-invariant, then there is aunique monetary stationary equilibrium (if any) and it is dynamically stable. If the initial real interest rate is greater than unity, unpleasant arithmetic is observed. If the real interest rate is less than unity at that steady state, itis still possible for unpleasant arithmetic to be observed. Thus, real world economies that have low real interest rates may observe unpleasant arithmetic. This section examines the sharp contrast between this result and that obtained in another version of the model that is virtually identical to this one except that the monetary pohcy rule is different. In particular, we consider an alternative rule wherein the government fixes the inflation rate at date 1and allows the bondsmoney ratio to adjust gradually to its new level This is very similar to the constant money growth rate pohcy rule described in Espinosa and Russell (2001) . As they show, and we confirm, this change in the rule is enough to produce the prediction that the only arithmetic one would observe in low real-rate economies is of the pleasant type. For sake of brevity, we briefly sketch the model A*-^1 2fi 7-^' n' fin^and tt" =1.53. For /i =5. • ' .
• -•=n>L Vt>.l : For ease of comp^isoii, we' tbo assume thatsaving is'return-invariant.' That is, S {uf{kt) ,Pt+i) = suj {kt) where 's = e (0; 1). Then, a binding monetary competitive equilibriiim of this economy [using (7)', (11) and (9)] is characterized by:
<l>f{kt+i)-\-' (40) It is important to note that the parameters ofthe economy outlined in Example 2 produce two values of the long-run bonds-money ratio (// = 7.11 and = 1.1). The latter coincides with the unique equiUbrium presented in Example 1. In other words, a fixed money-growth rule does not uniquely define a equilibrium value for the bonds-money ratio. In general, it is the case that a fixed inflation rate or money-growth rule can easily produce multiple equilibria even with return invariant saving. This possibility does not exist with a fixed bonds-money ratio rule as we have seen in Section 4.1.
Having characterized the stationary equilibria, we now ask the question; what happens to real interest rates when the government follows a tight money policy? In the present setup, a tight money policy would imply a cut in the inflation rate at all dates. Again, the reason for this focus is the ease of comparison with the results in Espinosa and Russell (1999, 2001 ). In their terminology, the conventional wisdom is that of pleasant arithmetic which, under a fixed inflation rate rule, may be characterized as tight money policies causing the real interest rate to rise. Then, unpleasant arithmetic would naturally be defined as a situation where tight money policies precipitate a fall in the real interest rate. What Espinosa and Russell find is that in situations where there are two stationary equilibria both with low (less than unity) real interest rates, the one with the lower (higher) interest rate exhibits pleasant (unpleasant) arithmetic. Not surprisingly, given the ample similarity between this current setup and their paper, we find the same result which we simply state here for completeness.
Lemma 5 A marginal tightening of the monetary policy achieved via a cut in the inflation rate causes the real interest rate to rise (fall) at pi (p^^. In other words, amarginal tightening produces pleasant arithmetic at the low real-rate equilibrium and produces unpleasant arithmetic' at the fiigh real-rate equilibrium. , • r,,
As an illustration,, consider the situation described in Example 2. If, ceteris parlbu's, 11 is cut , to 1.2, it is e^ily verified thatfalls to-<0.94 and.rises to 0.83.
Finally, we undertake, a quick study of.the local stability properties'of the two steady state equilibria. Recall, that the laws of motion are givisn by' (42) with associated eigenroots 0.35154, and 0.86488 (indicating that pi is a sink). Hence the configu ration is exactly as described in the phase diagram illustrated in Figure 6 .
In other words, as is the case in Espinosa and Russell (1999), the low real rate equilibrium IS dynamically stable while the higher red.rate equilibrium is not (it is potentially dynamically approachable though). In conjunction with Lemma 5, it follows that the equilibrium exhibiting pleasant arithmetic is the only dynamically stable equilibrium. It is this last observation that Espinosa and Russell (2001) use to make the argument that real world economies with low real interest rates are likely to exhibit only pleasant arithmetic.^t he central bank is following afixed-inflation rate rule, then it does not know which time path for k(and other real variables) to expect, because there is no unique path toward asteady state if it is asink. But when it tries to Ughten money, itis sure that pleasant arithmetic will obtain. On the other hand, if the central bank follows afixed f 7 equilibrium path to the steady state since it is a saddle, but then it h^arithmetic will obtain. This would be another way of characterizing the differences between our result and those obtained in Esp^sa and Russell (2001). 
